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I.

Introduction

The gradual deregulation of banking in the United States during the last quarter
of the 20th century has enabled measurement of commercial bank deposits as an
incubator of state economic growth. The “Great Recession” that occurred in the
United States between 2007 and 2010 further allows economists to test the
strength of the most visible result of banking deregulation – the widespread
proliferation of bank branching – in terms of its effect on state GDP.
If the economic effects of commercial bank branching and commercial deposit
depth could be isolated and calculated, an array of state-level financial
development questions could be answered, such as:
1.) Can we forecast the impact of commercial bank branches on state GDP,
relative to the impact of unit banks?
2.) What effect, if any, might bank deposits and/or bank branching have in
offsetting the effects of unemployment during a recession?
3.) Does the convenience of commercial bank branching provide an
intrinsically positive influence on fund supply?
4.) Does the depth of bank deposits and/or bank branching positively affect
state GDP notwithstanding the economic effect of bank failures?
This study attempts to identify influences of commercial bank deposits and
commercial bank branching on state economic indicators in a manner that might
address the concerns listed above. This paper will first provide the reader with
background information necessary to interpret the findings, followed by a review
of selected literature, a description of data, an outline of the methodology, a
1
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detailed report of the results, and finally, a conclusion summarizing the overall
findings and implications of the study.
II.

Background

Between 1970 and 1996, state and national regulations that restricted bank
branching and interstate banking were gradually relaxed, resulting in all 50 states
allowing at least some form of freedom in bank branching before the turn of the
century (Strahan 2003). Most notable among these deregulations was the RiegleNeal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994, which allowed
banks to open branches across state lines effective June 1997.1 Both state and
national deregulations activated a trend of banking-industry consolidation,
manifest through a constant succession of mergers and acquisitions (Wheelock
2011). The state-level deregulations enabled highly efficient banks to accumulate
a larger market presence by expanding their branch networks – often at the
expense of smaller and/or less efficient banks (Jayaratne & Strahan 1996).
Because efficiency was the presumed driver of a bank’s survival in postderegulation environments, quality of banks’ loan portfolios improved during
this consolidation period, and as a result, the collective performance of banks
that survived state deregulation created a positive impact on economic growth
(Jayaratne & Strahan 1996).

1
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Interstate banking deregulation further enhanced the durability of banks that
expanded their branch networks across state lines. Banks able to open new
interstate branches benefited from reduced profit-based bank risks – especially
where banks established branches within an economically diverse region (Shiers
2002). Thus, the overall result of deregulation was that highly efficient banks
were able to increase their size and reduce their risks, making them more likely to
outlast smaller, less efficient and less asset-diversified banks.
In conjunction with deregulation, improvements in information and
telecommunications technology also contributed to the consolidation of the
banking industry. Proliferation of electronic-payment systems, back-office IT
systems and credit-scoring technologies during the 1990s greatly increased
banking efficiency, and enabled long-distance loans (Berger 2003). In addition,
automated teller machines (ATMs) and debit cards enjoyed significant market
penetration during the 1990s and the 2000 decade, which elevated the role of
banks as a payment system for customers (Gerdes, Walton, Liu & Parke 2005).
These technologies usually benefited larger banks earlier than smaller banks
(presumably due to cost constraints faced by smaller banks), granting yet another
tangible advantage to larger, more efficient and more geographically-dispersed
banking institutions (Berger 2003).
This banking-consolidation trend continued into the financial crisis of 20072010, wherein bank concentration increased simultaneously with an increase of
bank failures. Of 318 bank failures that occurred between 2007 and 2010, about
94 percent were acquired through “purchase and assumption” (P&A) transactions
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by another institution – the acquiring institution typically was a larger bank with
more branches than the failed banks (Wheelock 2011). Most failed banks during
this period were small, but there were large banks that failed as well – the most
notable among these was Washington Mutual Bank, which was declared
insolvent in 2008, and acquired by JP Morgan Chase (Wheelock 2010). Other
large commercial banks, such as Countrywide Bank, Wachovia Bank and
National City Bank, were acquired by other banks during the financial crisis, but
were never officially declared “failed banks” or closed by regulators (Wheelock
2011). As of 2014, the nation’s largest commercial banks controlled trillions of
dollars of deposits, and owned thousands of offices across America.2 The top four
banks alone had about $3.58 trillion in deposits in 2014, comprising roughly 21
percent of US GDP that year.
In summary, the recent history of banking, leading up to and beyond the financial
crisis, has been a story of constant consolidation, in which the commercial
banking industry collectively sought to enhance performance by increasing
efficiency, improving technology, increasing merger-and-acquisition activity and
expanding branch penetration. As the US banking industry increases its depth
and improves its performance, economists theorize that economic factors will
improve as well, as shown by the literature review in the upcoming section.

2
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III.

Review of Selected Literature

Mainstream economic literature has depicted a perpetual two-way causality
between banking and economic growth. Specifically, existing literature describes
a pattern in which trade activity increases the depth of financial-market activity,
enabling investment in capital-intensive industrial projects, which ultimately
results in rapid economic growth. Historical studies establish banking as an
essential tool in the initial upward mobility of the world’s most developed
economies. Joseph Schumpeter (1911) established the concept of banking as the
necessary condition for entrepreneurship, stating that virtually every
entrepreneur is first a “debtor.” Alfred Marshall (1923) wrote that this
entrepreneurship condition evolved from a merchant-manufacturer relationship,
wherein the manufacturer initially borrowed from a merchant, who hired him to
make products, from which the merchant profited upon selling. As the business
of manufacturing became more ambitious, manufacturers began borrowing from
banks, enabled by pooled deposits from the public (Marshall 1923).
Alexander Gerschenkron (1962) describes banking as a useful device for
economies tasked with “catching-up” to the modern world. Gerschenkron
depicted banks as the determining factor in the development of French and
German economies during the nineteenth century, wherein banks mobilized
credit to fund large-scale heavy industry ventures. He further mentions that the
absence of a strong banking sector, often due to scarce financial capital, renders a
backward economy unable to fund the types of capital-intensive projects
necessary for economic modernization. Edward Shaw (1973) proposed that large-
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scale investment is made possible in the private sector when savings are pooled in
financial markets. Shaw recognized the streamlining effect that banking
efficiency has on the overall efficiency of an economy at large, stating that the
integration of capital markets causes the integration of labor, land and product
markets – creating more benefits from economies of scale and comparative
advantage in production. The dual causality of financial deepening and economic
growth was explained by Jeremy Greenwood and Bryan Jovanovic (1990), whose
extensive mathematical models showed that economic growth develops financial
structure, and consequently, financial structure enables higher growth. The most
notable conclusion of their research is that growth is usually slower when
exchange is unorganized – suggesting that robust banking systems provide the
most efficient investment opportunities within economies that are already robust.
Greenwood and Jovanovic specifically cited factors within a strong banking
system that directly affect economic growth. These factors include the pooling of
risk and the gathering of financial information – the latter allowing resources to
flow toward their most effective use, enabling the most profitable results of an
investment project.
Hidden within the literature is the constraint of the Modigliani-Miller Theorem,
which states, among other things, that a firm’s value remains the same regardless
of whether its funding structure consists of bank loans or stock sales (Modigliani
& Miller 1958). This theorem has prompted economists to distinguish between
bank-oriented economies, such as Japan and Germany, where banks play a much
more integrated role in economic development, and market-oriented systems,
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such as the United Kingdom and the United States, in which financial markets
(stock sales) play a stronger role (Levine 2002). Colin Mayer (1991) describes the
bank-oriented growth model as a “hands-on” endeavor, where banks form longterm committed relationships with entrepreneurs, which reduces moral hazard
and time-inconsistency problems. In their comprehensive study of European
industrial history, Rondo Cameron and Richard Tilly (1967) reinforce the concept
of banking as a catalyst for economic growth (Cameron et. al. 1967). Cameron
states that banking made a “positive and significant contribution” to England’s
Industrial Revolution – often despite poor and inefficient economic decisions
made by England’s government and central bank. Cameron cites country-banking
instruments, such as checks, shop notes and trade bills, as major catalysts of the
financial deepening that enabled the rapid and far-reaching proliferation of
England’s industrial growth. Cameron also credits Scotland’s robust banking
system as a determining factor in Scotland’s success in “catching up” to England’s
per-capita income levels during the nineteenth century. Tilly reinforces the image
of the banking-intensive German economy, stating that private German banks
were needed to flow funds into industries where capital was scarce. Tilly stated
that German banks formed long-term relationships with entrepreneurial firms,
which ultimately converted short-term credit into long-term credit.
An alternative theory of finance and economic development was initiated by Joan
Robinson (1952), who introduced the concept of fund supply as a measure of
“confidence” on the part of those who own financial wealth. Her now-infamous
quote, “where enterprise leads, finance follows,” appears to express the belief that
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enterprise creates prospects for financiers to supply funds in expectation of
future profit. From the same passage (from chapter 4.II of her 1952 book, The
Generalization of the General Theory), she expresses the importance of
economic confidence as it relates to finance and industry, in which she states, “A
high level of prospective profits and a high degree of confidence in these
prospects promote enterprise and at the same time ease the supply of finance.”
This quote is most important, because it eschews the current concept of dual
causality between finance and economic activity in favor of a more sequentiallylogical model – it is economic confidence that causes both enterprise activity and
finance simultaneously. This aspect of Robinson’s philosophy, as it relates to
some of the models in my research study, will be described in further detail
toward the end of this section.
Within American development history, Homer Hoyt (1941) and Douglass North
(1956) credit banks and financial institutions with strengthening America’s urban
economic base, allowing American cities to grow rapidly. Hoyt cited banking and
insurance as fundamental sources of workforce employment, and North stated
that external investment capital tends to flow into existing export industries,
which North believed were essential toward creating local employment that
causes cities to grow.
Within the subject of banking and its effect on development, newer literature has
revealed specific factors that positively impact economic growth. Levine,
Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen and Cihak (2013) created a useful global database using
four measures to assess a nation’s financial development: 1.) Size/depth; 2.)
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Access; 3.) Efficiency and 4.) Stability. They then compared correlations between
the four financial-development factors and the economic development levels of
various nations. According to Levine et al., financial development describes the
extent to which financial factors reduce the effects of imperfect markets, mostly
by drafting enforceable contracts, reducing transaction costs and employing
information technology. Levine et al. further propose that when financial
institutions succeed at mitigating the effects of imperfect markets, they enable
allocation of resources toward the most promising ideas and projects, and
thereby, yield economic development. Asli Demirguc-Kunt and Leora Klapper
(2012) discovered a link between bank-account access and the income levels of
nations. They found that bank account penetration is considerably less in low
income countries, where a small minority of people (24 percent) have formal
bank accounts, compared to a greater majority of people (89 percent) who have
bank accounts in high-income countries. With regard to banking deregulation,
Zou, Miller and Malamud (2009) discovered that banks enjoyed higher returns
on equity and higher returns on assets following the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (mentioned in the background
section), but efficiency gains differed between various income classes of banks.
With regard to smaller community banks, Emmons, Gilbert and Yeager (2004)
delineated two types of risks faced by small banks: 1.) Risks associated with nondiversified clients (idiosyncratic risk), and 2.) Risks associated with the absence
of bank branches (market risk). This implies that bank branching increases an
institution’s chances of survival. Although this view is generally supported by US
banking history, Craig Aubuchon and David Wheelock’s 2010 study of the
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banking industry recession revealed exceptions to this rule – as mentioned in the
previous section, several large banking institutions with sizable branch networks
still failed during the 2007-2010 recession. Because the 2007-2010 banking
recession represents an anomaly, this study generally assumes that larger and
more diversified banks enjoy greater security, at least in the face of local
economic downturns.
Existing literature measures banking factors using a variety of methods. With
regard to banking intensity, Raymond Goldsmith (1969) tracked the assets-toGNP ratio; Franklin Allen and Douglas Gale (1994) tracked the ratio of assets
divided by GDP and Ronald McKinnon (1973) measured banking intensity by the
ratio of banking liabilities (presumably deposits) divided by GNP. More recently,
Levine, Demirguc-Kunt, Feyen and Cihak (2013) used a statistic called “private
credit to GDP” ratio, which involves domestic private credit to the “real sector,”
and excludes credit issued to governments and public enterprises. Levine et al.
reported that this statistic is positively correlated with the income levels of
nations.
Other economists track banking strength by size. Robert King and Ross Levine
(1993) used the size of the financial sector relative to GDP as a measure of
financial development. Grabowski, Aly, Pasurka and Rangan (1990) estimated
the effect of bank size on technical efficiency, in which they measured a bank’s
size by total deposits and the number of branches. With respect to other
indicators, Michael Klein (1971) believed the convenience of banking locations
was a strong inducement for depositors, stating “…since demand deposits are
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used primarily for transactions, the proximity of the depositor to the bank is of
prime importance.”
In contrast to the existing literature, my study uses a wider assortment of
intensity and strength variables to gauge relationships between banking and state
GDP. Where King & Levine (1993), and Levine et.al (2013) measure banking
strength in terms of assets, my study measures commercial bank deposits in
terms of their dual nature. On a balance sheet, deposits represent a proxy for
Joan Robinson’s measure of economic confidence within a region. Deposits are
sourced on two general fronts – they are simultaneously fueled by fund supply on
the right-hand side of a bank’s balance sheet (deposits as liabilities), and
commercial lending generated by the left-hand side, which creates “new private
saving” in the form of deposits made by eventual borrowers (Tobin 1963). From a
competitive-market standpoint, deposits may be similar to an employment rate –
my findings suggest they are the mechanism by which financial-industry
expansion and streamlining can be inferred. My study also attempts a specific
path with regard to branch banking. Whereas Benston et al. (1982) and Powers
(1969) successfully measured the economy-of-scale and/or efficiency capabilities
between branches and unit banks, my study tracks the ability of branching weight
and banking consolidation to positively impact state GDP while withstanding
economic shocks associated with recessions and bank failures. This is feasible
because of two important banking events that occurred during the time-interval
of my study: 1.) In 2003, electronic payments outnumbered the usage of checks
for the first time in American history – indicating the ability of technology (which
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primarily favors larger banks) to vastly improve the efficiency of the “payment
system” function of the finance industry (Gerdes et.al 2005); and 2.) The
financial crisis of 2007-2010 caused a massive wave of bank failures – many of
which were resolved by acquisitions transactions (Wheelock 2010). For these
reasons, I am able to test the effects of consolidation (fueled by deregulation,
technology and bank failures) and bank deposits (a partial proxy for Joan
Robinson’s concept of economic confidence) against the effects of cyclical
economic downturns (visible during the financial crisis of 2007-2010).
IV.

Data

This section describes and defines the banking and financial data used in this
study, and specifies general trends observed within the data. My study uses
financial and sector-industry data within a cross-section of all 50 states in the
United States of America (not including the District of Columbia), across a timeinterval spanning 2000 to 2010. My goal was to obtain data that would allow
calculation of: 1.) Banking factor elasticities of state GDP, 2.) Weights of banking
activity, and 3.) Banking factor elasticities of income pertaining to state
industries – most notably, construction, trade and financial services. Banking
data were obtained from the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s (FDIC)
Historical Statistics on Banking database.3 These data include total commercial
bank deposits (foreign and domestic), total number of banking institutions,
number of banks with branches, number of unit banks (stand-alone banks that

3
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do not operate branches), total number of branches and total number of bank
offices. The “total number of banking institutions” statistic is recorded by the
FDIC as the sum of the “number of unit banks” statistic plus the “number of
banks with branches” figure. The “total number of bank offices” statistic is
recorded by the FDIC as the sum of the “total number of banking institutions”
figure plus the “total number of branches” statistic. This means unit banks can be
weighted both as a percentage of banking institutions and as a percentage of
bank offices, while bank branches only can be weighted as a percentage of bank
offices. Descriptive statistics of these variables are visible in Table A1.
Table A1 - Descriptive Statistics
Variable
State GDP Log
Manufacturing Log
Manufacturing Share of GDP
Transportation Log
Financial Svcs Log
Financial Svcs Share of GDP
Unemployment Rate
Deposits Log
Deposits Relative to State GDP
Banks Log
Branches Log
Branches Per 100,000 residents
Offices Log
Branches Per Offices
Unit Banks Per Offices
Deposits Per Office Log
Deposits Per Capita Log
Unit Banks Log
Unit Banks Per 100,000 Residents
Banks with Branches
Banks With Branches Log
Total Banks
Population Log
National Fed Funds Rate
Failed Banks
Farm GDP Log
Oil & Gas Extraction Log
Mining Log
Construction Log
Wholesale Trade Log
Retail Trade Log
Total Trade Log

Number of Observations
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550
550

Mean
25.7188
23.5713
0.1309
22.2161
22.9186
0.0693
5.5319
24.5513
0.7254
4.4504
6.8570
27.1910
6.9687
0.8976
0.0297
17.5826
9.4436
2.8999
1.1205
109.5964
4.1613
149.3109
15.1077
2.7036
0.5327
20.7673
14.6104
19.7618
22.6567
22.8060
23.0047
23.6107

Standard Deviation
1.0513
1.2883
0.0563
1.0450
1.2214
0.0450
1.9834
1.3891
1.8091
1.1917
0.9985
7.6744
0.9899
0.0739
0.0339
1.0826
1.0901
1.3929
1.5867
101.8266
1.1777
146.8852
1.0112
1.9883
2.3161
1.3373
8.0469
2.0761
1.0293
1.1556
1.0135
1.0715

Min
23.5754
20.5405
0.0190
19.7919
20.2596
0.0192
2.3000
21.3241
0.0167
1.3863
4.7536
12.3982
4.8040
0.6667
0.0000
15.5190
6.7089
0.0000
0.0000
4.0000
1.3863
4.0000
13.1109
0.1600
0.0000
16.3004
0.0000
0.0000
20.5713
20.3975
20.9384
21.4164

Max
28.3214
26.2366
0.2983
24.5320
26.0060
0.3164
13.7833
28.0663
23.9535
6.5667
8.8406
49.5765
8.8811
0.9747
0.1920
21.4531
13.9457
5.5013
9.2775
470.0000
6.1527
711.0000
17.4333
6.2400
24.0000
23.8052
25.7589
22.7900
25.2732
25.4259
25.5413
26.1627
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Per Table A1, the logs of the economic sector indicators mostly show substantial
but comparable numerical ranges, and the bank statistics show a relatively wide
range. The logs of the total number of banking institutions ranged from 1.3863 to
6.5667. When coupled with a mean of 4.4504, this range indicates that the
number of overall banking institutions varied greatly across states as well as time.
Also remarkable is the range of the “bank branches per total bank offices”
statistic – it ranged from 0.6667 to 0.9747, with a mean of 0.8976 and a standard
deviation of 0.0739. This relatively high mean suggests banks across the United
States generally followed a trend of increasing the overall number of bank
branches per state per year (presumably to make bank branches “convenient” to
attract lenders’ deposits, and possibly, to attract customers to purchase loans).
The “unit banking per 100,000 residents” statistic shows the opposite trend, the
range extends from zero (0) to 9.2775, but the mean is low – it’s 1.1205, with a
small standard deviation of 1.5867 – indicating a national trend toward reducing
the population of unit banks per state per year.
Industry data were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA)
Interactive Data Application website.4 These data include state GDP, state
financial and insurance services GDP and state manufacturing GDP. I also
obtained state industry GDP data for farming, transportation, mining, oil & gas
extraction, trade (wholesale and retail) and construction from this same
database. I obtained state unemployment rates from the Bureau of Labor
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Statistics (BLS) database.5 Elsewhere, the federal funds rate was obtained from
the Federal Reserve Board of Governors website database;6 ten-year inclusive
state population data were garnered from the United States Census 2012
Intercensal Estimates application;7 and failed banks data were obtained from the
“Failures & Assistance” database on the FDIC Historical Statistics on Banking
(HSOB) website.8
The data are organized in panel regression format – the cross section variable is
the state, and the time variable is the year. By and large, the data show steady
increases in GDP, with minor downturns in 2009, presumably due to the
nationwide recession that began in 2007 and created visible industry-income
losses during 2009. Unemployment took an abrupt jump in most states during
2009, and several states saw short decreases in bank deposits circa 2009-2010.
V.

Methodology

The following paragraphs outline the models used in this study, and attempt to
describe the purposes and expected outcomes of each model. Existing literature
promotes three concepts: 1.) Robust financial systems are associated with GDP
growth; 2.) Increased bank branching improves overall banking efficiency, which

5
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increases economic growth; and 3.) Larger banks (presumably those with
multiple branches) tend to survive local economic recessions better than unit
banks. Existing literature also suggests that failed unit banks tend to merge into
larger banks, wherein the larger bank converts the unit bank’s subsidiaries into
branches, which further hedges banking risks. The goal of the models listed below
is to test the impact of bank deposit magnitude on state GDP, and to test the
impact upon state GDP of changes in the number of bank branches, unit banks
and total bank offices. The dependent variable for the first group of models is the
natural logarithm of state GDP (sgdp), measured in state “i” at year “t.”
First Group:
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2officesit + b3ffit + b4poplnit + uit

(1)

sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2brit + b3ubit + b4ffit + b5poplnit + uit

(2)

sgdpit = b0 + b1dpoit + b2brit + b3ubit + b4ffit + b5poplnit + uit

(3)

sgdpit = b0 + b1dpclit + b2brit + b3ubit + b4ffit + b5poplnit + uit

(4)

sgdpit = b0 + b1cpdit + b2brit + b3ubit + b4ffit + b5poplnit + uit

(5)

Regarding the independent variables in the first model, the term “b0” is the
vertical intercept, “dlit” is the natural log of commercial bank deposits, “officesit”
is the natural log of the number of total bank offices, “ffit” is the federal funds rate
and “poplnit” is the natural log of state population. In model (2), I replaced
“officesit” with two related but mutually-exclusive banking variables: the first,
“brit,” is the natural log of the number of bank branches, and the second, “ubit,” is
the natural log of the number of unit banks. I did this to test if “brit,” would turn
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out positive simultaneously with the “ubit” variable turning out negative (as one
might predict from the existing literature). In model (3) I re-ran a variant of
model (2), replacing “dlit” with “dpoit,” which is the natural log of the ratio of
commercial bank deposits per bank office. I used “dpoit,” to determine if the
weight of deposits per office (a subtle proxy for deposit concentration) would
produce a positive elasticity coefficient. I used a similar approach in model (4),
replacing “dpoit” with “dpclit,” which is the natural log of the ratio of commercial
bank deposits per capita. This was intended to determine if positive elasticity
would result from changes in the weight of deposits per population – testing the
effect upon state GDP of deposit growth relative to population. Intuitively, this
type of growth would reveal economic confidence, among both depositors and
investors, toward the economic prospects in a particular state. Model (5) replaces
the “dpclit,” variable with “cpdit,” which represents commercial bank deposits as a
percentage of state GDP. This variable is meant to test the weight of deposits in
context with the state’s overall activity. I used this variable because I wanted to
determine whether the deposits to state GDP ratio could provide a useful
benchmark by which a commercial banking sector could be judged. This first
group of equations was assembled to test the effects of raw banking size and
deposit factors on state GDP growth, and the federal funds rate and state
population size were used as control variables. The second group of equations are
intended to measure the elasticities and causalities of commercial bank
branching weights pertaining to their effect on state GDP, and against the
economic effect of bank failures.
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Second Group:
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2bpoit + b3ffit + b4fbit + b5poplnit + uit

(6)

sgdpit = b0 + b1dpclit + b2bpoit + b3ffit + b4fbit + b5poplnit + uit

(7)

sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2brptit + b3ubptit + b4ffit + b5poplnit + uit

(8)

The second group of equations tests the relationship between bank branching
depth and state GDP. The variable “bpoit” represents commercial bank branches
as a percentage of total bank offices, “fbit” represents the number of failed banks
in state “i” during year “t,” “brptit” and “ubptit” represent branches per 100,000
residents and unit-banks per 100,000 residents respectively. These equations are
designed test the hypothesis that branch weight yields a persistently positive
economic result notwithstanding the negative effect of failed banks.
Third Group:
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2bit + b3ffit + b4poplnit + uit

(9)

sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2bwbit + b3ffit + b4poplnit + uit

(10)

sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2bwbshareit + b3ffit + b4poplnit + uit

(11)

The third group of equations test the effect of deposits on state GDP, against a
persistent backdrop of bank consolidations that have caused reductions in the
total number of institutions. These models are designed to test whether bank
consolidation aids state GDP by streamlining financial services. The expression
“bit” is the logarithm of the total number of banking institutions in state “i”
during year “t,” “bwbit” represents the logarithm of the number of banks that
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have branches (“bwbit” is therefore a subset of “bit”). The expression “bwbshareit”
represents the weight of this subset relationship – it’s the number of banks with
branches as a percentage of the total number of banking institutions.
Fourth Group:
sgdpit = b0 + b1dlit + b2ffit + b3umpit + b4poplnit + uit

(12)

sgdpit = b0 + b1dpoit + b2ffit + b3umpit + b4poplnit + uit

(13)

sgdpit = b0 + b1dpclit + b2ffit + b3umpit + b4poplnit + uit

(14)

sgdpit = b0 + b1bwbshareit + b2ffit + b3umpit + b4poplnit + uit

(15)

The fourth group of models uses the same variables used in the first group,
however, the models test the impact of deposit weights on state GDP against a
backdrop of unemployment – the expression “umpit” refers to the unemployment
rate in state “i” during year “t.” The last equation of the group (15) specifically
tracks the impact upon state GDP of the share of banks with branches,
notwithstanding the effect of the unemployment rate.
Fifth Group:
dlit = b0 + b1officesit + b2ffit + b3fspgdpit + uit

(16)

dlit = b0 + b1brit + b2ffit + b3fspgdpit + uit

(17)

The fifth group of equations tests the source of the deposits. On its face, this
might appear to create an endogeneity problem. For this reason, I test the effects
of the logarithms of offices and branches on the logarithm of deposits, but set
against the weight of financial services sector GDP (“fspgdpit”). This pairing was
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meant to isolate the possible causal effect of financial industry robustness on
commercial deposit magnitude. My hypothesis is that both the office/branch
variables and the financial sector weight variable will result in positive first-order
conditions, which means that branch convenience (representing the source of
funds on the right-hand side of the balance sheet) and financial sector income
weight (a partial proxy for left-hand side effectiveness relative to state GDP) both
simultaneously feed the magnitude of commercial deposits.
Sixth Group:
fsit = b0 + b1brit + b2ubit + b3poplnit + uit

(18)

fsit = b0 + b1brptit + b2ubptit + b3poplnit + uit

(19)

cnsit = b0 + b1brit + b2ubit + b3poplnit + uit

(20)

tradeit = b0 + b1brit + b2ubit + b3poplnit + uit

(21)

transit = b0 + b1brit + b2ubit + b3poplnit + uit

(22)

The sixth group of equations uses natural logarithms of the following industry
subsets: financial and insurance services GDP (fsit), construction GDP (cnsit),
trade GDP (tradeit) and transportation GDP (transit). I used the sector-industry
GDP expressions as dependent variables, and I used the “branches vs unit banks”
expressions as independent variables. Equation (18) tests the effects of branch
banking versus unit banks on financial and insurance services GDP, and equation
(19) does the same, replacing the branch and unit bank variables with the
branches per 100,000 residents variable and the unit-banks per 100,000
residents variable. Equations (20), (21) and (22) test the effects of branch
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banking and unit banking on construction (cnsit), trade (tradeit) and
transportation (transit) respectively. Existing literature implies the expectation
that branch-banking elasticity signs should remain positive throughout, and unit
banking signs should remain negative. If my hypothesis is correct, it would
indicate that certain homogeneous industries – or, industries abundant to most
states regardless of climate, topography and/or natural resource abundance –
should be positively affected by the proliferation of commercial bank branching.
For robustness, I calculated R-squared, t-test and Wald test values. I also
conducted two additional tests, regressing log of state GDP (dependent variable)
on log of commercial deposits (independent variable) using both one lag and two
lags of the “dlit” variable.
VI.

Results

I used random effects panel regression to estimate all coefficients because of two
factors 1.) The slow-moving nature of the variables, and 2.) The Fed Funds Rate
variable, which is a national statistic with the same figures for all 50 states. This
means the “ffit” statistic will be cluster-invariant for each year of the sample. The
following model results reveal coefficients that support the descriptive statistics
in Table A1 – unit banks followed a trend of reducing, while branches showed a
trend of increasing weight, and both statistics were related to increases in state
GDP on the aggregate.
The first group of equations produced elasticity estimates that mostly support the
existing literature on banking factors, and their effects on economic growth. In
the first group of equations, elasticity coefficients for deposits turned out positive,

22

but less than unit-elastic, in all experiments. When placed in perspective with the
large size of state GDP (totaling hundreds of billions of dollars in some states),
this indicates that commercial banking deposits maintained a decently important
correlation with state GDP.
Elasticity coefficients for the “branch banking vs. unit banking” effects also
support existing literature. Table B1 in the Appendix section shows the results of
regression model (1): The log of deposits was 0.0380766, with a robust standard
error of 0.0152868. The positive sign of this estimated coefficient suggests that
sheer deposit size is positively correlated with state GDP levels. The log of total
bank offices also was positive, and slightly more elastic than the deposits log,
indicating that convenience for lenders and customers might have a positive
correlation with state GDP magnitude.
Branch banking throughout the second through the fifth models showed
coefficients that were positive and less than unit-elastic, and unit bank
coefficients remained negative and less than unit-elastic. The model (2) results
(see Table B2) show the branch banks log coefficient was 0.5418656, and the unit
banks log coefficient was -0.1379699, suggesting that the population of unit
banks may be negatively correlated with state GDP, notwithstanding fluctuations
of the federal funds rate. Model (3) results maintained the similar results (see
Table B3): The coefficient for the log of deposits per office was 0.0330969, very
close to the pure deposits coefficient. The bank branches log coefficient was
0.599838, and the unit banks log coefficient was -0.1363223, also proximal to the
same levels shown in the model (2) results.
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Model (4) continues this trend: the coefficient of deposits per capita was
0.0308956, the branch banking coefficient was 0.5418656, and the unit banking
coefficient was -0.1379699 (see Table B4). Bearing in mind the economic
recession that occurred during the last two years of the observation period, the
results of the first four models suggest that unit banks may indeed have been
swallowed by larger, more efficient banks since the beginning of the 2000
decade, causing branches to increase simultaneously with the decrease of unit
banks. Considering the fact that elasticity coefficients for bank offices also
remained positive throughout the experiment, the “branch vs unit” results also
support the assertion that larger banks with visible branching networks may
indeed have more efficient qualities than unit banks, as they are more convenient
to a larger array of customers, and the merger activity that occurred during the
recession may have enabled larger banks to reduce costs by converting unit
banks’ subsidiaries into branches.
Model 5 suggests possible importance of the deposits to state GDP ratio. The
coefficient for this variable was positive, 0.007959, and the coefficients for
branching banks log and unit banks log were 0.5689024 and -0.1358097
respectively (See Table B5). From an economic-intuition perspective, the
“deposits to state GDP” ratio, when converted to a whole number percentage,
represents the number of dollars people are willing to invest into a state’s
commercial banking system for every one dollar of existing economic transaction
activity in that state. When this ratio is positively correlated with state GDP, it
suggests: 1.) That people are “betting” that the state’s economy will provide some
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type of return, and 2.) This level of confidence might have a self-perpetuating,
positive effect on state GDP, similar to the appreciative effect that widespread
buying can have on the price of a corporate stock. The fact that this value was
positive notwithstanding the branch-log and unit banking-log coefficients
suggests that merger and acquisition activity – that is, shuffling of the ratio of
branches to unit banks – should not affect the economic character and the
economic influence of the “deposits to state GDP” ratio – especially where this
shuffling is driven by efficiency motive. Fluctuations in federal funds rate also
should not affect the properties of these coefficients. In total, these findings
suggest that efficiency and confidence factors may enable a state’s economy to
withstand a wave of bank mergers and acquisitions.
The second group of equations resulted in positive relationships between
commercial branch weight and state GDP, even despite the negative effect of
bank failures (see C-series Tables). I find these results remarkable because the
“bpoit” variable (branches per total number of bank offices), produces the
strongest coefficient of all banking variables – it exceeds 4.1 in models (6) and
(7), implying that a bank office population comprised of a growing percentage of
branches correlates with a slightly faster-growing state GDP. As shown in tables
A2 and A3 of the descriptive statistics, it is worth noting that the “bpoit” variable
(branches per total bank offices) produced positive compound annual growth
rates (CAGR), as well as positive 11-year growth rates, for all fifty states, even in
states where deposit growth and overall bank-population growth were negative.
This suggests branch penetration can positively affect economic growth
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regardless of whether commercial deposits are increasing, or if commercial
deposits show signs of “streamlining” or “rightsizing” during a wave of bank
failures and/or industry recessions. This phenomenon could be occurring
because of FDIC deposit payouts from one or more bank failures. David
Wheelock and Paul Wilson (1995) stated that bank failures are often associated
with low capitalization, which indicates poor asset performance. In addition,
Wheelock (2011) mentioned that a large number of commercial banks that failed
during the financial crisis were relatively small – operating a median of three
branches each, and operating in a relatively limited geographic area. This means
statewide deposit losses may represent “inefficient money” that gained poor
returns on assets, and eventually caused insolvency. Under this scenario, a small,
inefficient bank with poor asset performance and limited geographic penetration
would have a negligible impact on state GDP whether it survives or fails,
regardless of the size of its deposits. This, however, is conjecture, and further
empirical research in this area might yield a better understanding of deposit
streamlining.
Elasticity coefficients within the third group of equations further exemplify a
trend toward consolidation – the total number of banks, along with the number
of banks with branches, both showed a negative relationship toward state GDP,
notwithstanding the positive relationship between deposits and state GDP. This
indicates that deposits, by-and-large, did not decrease on the aggregate, despite
the decrease in overall banking institutions (see D-series tables). This trend fits
the literature, which theorizes that bank consolidations are the inevitable result
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of profit-maximizing institutions seeking greater size and efficiency – causing the
total number of institutions to shrink (including smaller or less efficient banks
that operate a few branches), as the overall strength and depth of the financialservices industry increases.
Within the fourth group (see E-series tables), the deposit variables remained
positive and less-than unit elastic for models (12) through (14). In model (15), the
share of banks as a percentage of state GDP, maintained a positive and less-than
unit elastic coefficient despite the effect of unemployment. Note that
unemployment rate produces positive coefficients throughout models (12)
through (15), indicating the economy’s possible efforts to profit via workforce
streamlining in the face of low consumption during the recession period.
The fifth group of models revealed positive relationships between commercial
bank branching and commercial deposits. In addition, the robustness of the
financial services industry, as measured by the percentage of state GDP
comprised by financial and insurance services income, showed a positive
influence on deposits (see F-series tables). These two results represent a
remarkable finding – they lend support to Klein’s theory (1971) of bank
branching convenience as a competitive inducement for new customers among
commercial banks.
The sixth group of equations reveals positive relationships between commercial
bank branching and various homogenous industries, including construction,
financial/insurance services, trade and transportation, with a negative influence
of unit banking on these same sectors (see G-series Tables). This branching vs
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unit banking relationship, however, did not hold for the manufacturing, oil & gas,
mining and farming industries.
These findings suggest that banking factors have a visible association with the
construction, transportation, trade and financial industries. This relationship
may exist for the manufacturing industry, but my study failed to produce
significant coefficients for manufacturing – presumably due to Schumpeter’s law
of “creative destruction.” The experiments also failed to produce significant
overall associations between banking factors and the aggregate incomes of
natural resource-based industries, such as oil & gas extraction, farming and
mining. Therefore, these models and results were eliminated from the study.
Lagged regression tests revealed a small but significant relationship between
bank deposits and state GDP, where log of state GDP was the dependent variable,
and log of deposits was independent. In all versions, the one-year lagged
variables had the strongest coefficients, with positive and inelastic relationships
with state GDP, (in the one-year lagged model, the coefficient was 0.0871451, and
in the two-year lagged model, it was 0.0479005 for the first lag and 0.0341647
for the second lag). For these lagged variable tests, the p-values and F-statistics
were significant at five (5) percent probability levels. Wald chi-square tests
confirmed an overall significant fit for all models throughout the experiment.
VII.

Conclusion

This paper studied the influence of commercial bank deposits and commercial
bank branching on state GDP. The findings suggest the following: 1.) The
magnitude of commercial bank deposits generally has a positive relationship with
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state GDP, with a substantial but less than unit-elastic influence. 2.) The
proliferation of commercial bank branches is also positively correlated with state
GDP, with a substantial but less than unit-elastic influence. 3.) The percentage of
commercial bank offices comprised of branches has a positive relationship with
state GDP, even against a backdrop volatile bank merger-and-acquisition
activities and/or bank failures. Current trends indicate that proliferation of unit
banking is negatively related to state GDP. 4.) The number of commercial bank
branches per capita has a positive influence on the magnitude of commercial
bank deposits, notwithstanding changes in the federal funds rate. 5.) The
robustness of a state’s financial services industry, as measured by the percentage
of state GDP comprised by the state’s financial and insurance sector income, also
is positively correlated with commercial bank deposit growth. 6.) Commercial
bank branching depth is positively correlated with the growth of homogenous
sectors, as measured by construction GDP, trade GDP, transportation GDP and
financial and insurance services GDP (but not weight). Unit bank depth is
negatively related with growth in these same sectors. These “branching vs. unit
bank” relationships do not hold for the manufacturing sector, as well as the oil,
mining and farming sectors.
The empirical results imply that commercial bank branching may be an essential
building block that 1.) Advances and fortifies a state’s financial structure, 2.)
Creates geographic convenience necessary to create substantial deposit
magnitude, and 3.) Enables a state’s economy to withstand and/or recover from
adverse economic shocks – even shocks as drastic and unexpected as the
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financial crisis of 2007-2010. However, as the literature indicates, there is dual
causality involved within the relationship between commercial banking and state
economic growth. From this study, we can loosely theorize that commercial
banking deposits might represent the metaphorical axis that gauges the
relationship between commercial branching (a generator of saving and
investment) and state economic growth. The ratio of commercial bank deposits
to state GDP, which has a positive correlation with overall state GDP growth,
suggests that commercial banking agents (on the fund supply and demand sides)
need to have a certain degree of confidence in a state’s economy to effectuate a
strong relationship between commerce and state economic growth. As Joan
Robinson indicates, economic activity must already show a certain level of
robustness to supply funds (in the form of deposits), and as Joseph Schumpeter
suggests, this same economic activity must also be robust enough for the banking
system to further invest in industrial prospects. This confidence-breedsconfidence relationship suggests a state’s economy may benefit from policies that
strengthen commercial bank branching penetration, which generates the deposit
depth necessary to incubate new investment, sectoral-industry profits and overall
state economic growth.
This study creates further opportunities for research. The statistics in Tables A2
and A3 reveal the possibility that bank deposits may indeed follow a “cycle,”
similar to GDP and employment. It seems logical during a wave of bank failures
that bank deposit fluctuation is a self-adjusting device that automatically fosters
financial-industry efficiency during times of adverse economic shocks. This is
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obvious on its face, considering the money-supply goals of the “quantitative
easing” program devised by the Federal Reserve Bank during the financial crisis.
However, in today’s world of increased technology, it seems plausible that
maximizing the population of banked citizens can further enhance deposit
strength, which can minimize economic risks and shorten the length of economic
recessions in future years.
From a development standpoint, another worthwhile extension could involve
widening the research time-interval, and testing the overall relationship between
deposits and rapid-growth industries from the beginning of the American
industrial-revolution era until today. By now, mainstream economists already
know capital accumulation is necessary for growth, and that banking is a
necessary mechanism for investment in capital. What is needed for developing
nations (and communities) is an in-depth dynamic model that pinpoints the best
industries to compliment the natural resources of an area, and the level of funds a
state should invest to manufacture Joan Robinson’s concept of “economic
confidence.” Once economic confidence penetrates a culture as a self-correcting
mechanism, as it has in the United States, developing cultures may adapt a
greater affinity for entrepreneurship.
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Table A2 - Compound Annual Growth Rates
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

State GDP
0.035285252
0.062878412
0.037313263
0.039688323
0.03292892
0.034230688
0.030529227
0.02975346
0.03691678
0.027776264
0.046132322
0.034279147
0.026181733
0.029363346
0.03742408
0.035205041
0.033931179
0.051461517
0.031649572
0.045378723
0.029375883
0.008557732
0.032051359
0.033953913
0.028687696
0.049780277
0.043401236
0.042303439
0.032684991
0.029029761
0.038193737
0.03467023
0.039049975
0.06320362
0.021439466
0.046693011
0.044942864
0.033066892
0.033313076
0.032096772
0.047385587
0.030211452
0.047094297
0.048266405
0.034301318
0.042216644
0.038229475
0.041160928
0.030959512
0.079619386

Bank Deposits
0.025636018
-0.019319656
-0.085673549
0.069746648
0.020863269
0.004937802
0.194462749
0.188380624
0.052488115
0.061642033
0.032354111
0.079518207
-0.00423466
-0.018052372
0.030102792
0.024535741
0.004954495
0.010716371
0.076965764
-0.056463334
0.051224048
-0.075498187
-0.084210512
0.055033777
0.053004425
0.060569477
0.040860578
0.452529031
-0.162890143
-0.047035393
0.021115696
-0.065479489
0.059261206
0.01088721
0.183930291
0.043173809
0.104558151
-0.02957164
-0.022760279
0.031237315
0.469062197
0.00236595
0.059320984
0.10324304
-0.06372458
0.195948105
0.079556718
0.034983031
0.051540749
0.003836303

Banks
-0.01354
-0.03619
-0.01292
-0.03572
-0.01727
-0.04666
-0.00403
-0.04026
-0.01678
-0.02704
-0.01207
-0.01065
-0.02686
-0.03619
-0.02003
-0.01711
-0.02368
-0.01095
-0.04538
-0.03859
-0.01854
-0.02847
-0.02279
-0.01347
-0.01458
-0.01644
-0.02286
-0.0187
-0.05096
-0.02401
-0.01065
-0.01741
-0.0037
-0.01808
-0.03173
-0.0147
-0.02723
-0.02919
0
-0.02036
-0.01849
-0.01019
-0.02011
-0.00499
-0.06107
-0.02854
-0.0187
-0.01392
-0.02368
-0.02711

Branches Per Offices
0.002090866
0.001408812
0.001953562
0.007323952
0.002719125
0.009763555
0.0018909
0.006479992
0.002113087
0.005448545
0.000208239
0.001415409
0.009395552
0.003278711
0.013302284
0.010737476
0.004716005
0.00211614
0.001340024
0.002294288
0.00166173
0.002053903
0.011827421
0.001897296
0.005339538
0.009846002
0.01631667
0.003031383
0.003258643
0.000925504
0.001621029
0.001389723
0.000490773
0.008056074
0.002213868
0.009701512
0.002402956
0.001223878
0.000917831
0.00231007
0.0080452
0.002467995
0.008697828
0.0013787
0.00310232
0.002252882
0.002366647
0.002536552
0.006308962
0.013704429

Unit Banks Per Offices
-0.033838491
0
-0.100520555
-0.110969918
-0.019463158
-0.095456017
-0.05881203
-0.071518516
-0.098884966
-0.060399206
0.006628343
0.012508867
-0.074965339
-0.082730458
-0.070715055
-0.055073504
-0.071918014
-0.051527003
0.014404602
0.021014726
-0.010496382
-0.059155775
-0.043219792
-0.075704885
-0.050379981
-0.044813521
-0.076675731
-0.045645643
-0.091793201
-0.082372833
-0.056002132
-0.037083996
-0.019984587
-0.055771341
-0.073642432
-0.05349348
-0.095042527
-0.024341673
0.016214664
-0.124326596
-0.055604383
-0.082291174
-0.083884567
0.000373107
-1
-0.057116553
-0.063452806
-0.078224174
-0.071700101
-0.128584078
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Table A3 - 11-Year Growth Rate (2000-2010)
State
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California
Colorado
Connecticut
Delaware
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky
Louisiana
Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan
Minnesota
Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
New Hampshire
New Jersey
New Mexico
New York
North Carolina
North Dakota
Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island
South Carolina
South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington
West Virginia
Wisconsin
Wyoming

State GDP
0.464401966
0.955777514
0.496267489
0.534386711
0.428153236
0.448076891
0.392077607
0.380593613
0.489988543
0.351712785
0.642301258
0.448823407
0.328822816
0.374851196
0.498026752
0.463154404
0.443470632
0.736709596
0.408815833
0.629334384
0.375035399
0.098268162
0.414863072
0.4438198
0.364957087
0.706406507
0.595749857
0.57737836
0.424447717
0.36995811
0.510297318
0.454860951
0.52405556
0.962370074
0.262812801
0.6520096
0.621877276
0.430253033
0.434006685
0.41554806
0.664073581
0.387362998
0.658989876
0.679532247
0.44916507
0.575934085
0.510869293
0.55846295
0.398484665
1.322616024

Bank Deposits
0.321070217
-0.193132586
-0.626651746
1.09937623
0.254998944
0.055676883
6.061528449
5.675920918
0.755452989
0.93089721
0.419435315
1.32022279
-0.045607409
-0.181588773
0.385754208
0.305564251
0.055869793
0.124403793
1.26058516
-0.472349204
0.732399949
-0.578317634
-0.620027476
0.802727162
0.764948999
0.909547056
0.553524698
59.72577028
-0.858548677
-0.411367165
0.258416692
-0.525236616
0.883795424
0.126496174
5.406007653
0.591928007
1.985894319
-0.281216204
-0.22373104
0.402635464
67.77680798
0.026335517
0.884965167
1.947020527
-0.515337024
6.158725092
1.321133434
0.45970644
0.738149691
0.043018172

Banks
-0.139240506
-0.333333333
-0.133333333
-0.32972973
-0.174342105
-0.408839779
-0.043478261
-0.363636364
-0.169811321
-0.26035503
-0.125
-0.111111111
-0.258790436
-0.333333333
-0.199535963
-0.17287234
-0.231759657
-0.11409396
-0.4
-0.351351351
-0.186046512
-0.272189349
-0.224032587
-0.138613861
-0.149171271
-0.166666667
-0.224637681
-0.1875
-0.4375
-0.234567901
-0.111111111
-0.175675676
-0.04
-0.181818182
-0.298578199
-0.15034965
-0.261904762
-0.278074866
0
-0.202531646
-0.18556701
-0.106598985
-0.200282087
-0.053571429
-0.5
-0.272727273
-0.1875
-0.142857143
-0.231746032
-0.260869565

Branches Per Offices
0.023241481
0.015606557
0.021700318
0.08357947
0.03032036
0.112798702
0.02099767
0.073634859
0.0234911
0.061593746
0.002293018
0.015680155
0.108345731
0.036662922
0.156456333
0.124662087
0.053116766
0.023525401
0.014839424
0.025528681
0.01843166
0.022826388
0.138075031
0.021069377
0.060328394
0.113798573
0.19486692
0.033855248
0.036434852
0.010227791
0.01797655
0.015393617
0.005411772
0.092274007
0.024623916
0.112046817
0.026752396
0.013545343
0.010142607
0.02570632
0.092144412
0.027485438
0.099947465
0.015270673
0.03465982
0.025062746
0.026343372
0.028258648
0.071629707
0.161514898

Unit Banks Per Offices
-0.315226337
0
-0.688180208
-0.725791434
-0.19443038
-0.668314429
-0.486618705
-0.557915058
-0.68188614
-0.49606198
0.075376884
0.146534653
-0.575636458
-0.613217603
-0.553688668
-0.463736427
-0.560002939
-0.441176471
0.17037037
0.25704859
-0.109587489
-0.488677434
-0.384916595
-0.579353544
-0.433697507
-0.396093326
-0.584188249
-0.401855288
-0.65323741
-0.611555577
-0.469505178
-0.340108624
-0.199130106
-0.468076772
-0.568912736
-0.453789919
-0.66664277
-0.237437733
0.193548387
-0.767852637
-0.467041257
-0.611175166
-0.618537201
0.004111842
-1
-0.476353596
-0.513787257
-0.591794872
-0.558865185
-0.77997076
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Table B1 Regression of State GDP on Deposits and Offices
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Log

0.0380766**
(0.013)
0.402812***
(0.000)
-0.0145308***
(0.000)
0.6851535***
(0.000)
11.66506***
(0.000)

Offices Log
Fed Funds Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9331

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B2 Regression of State GDP on Branches and Unit Banks
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Log

0.0308956***
(0.008)
0.5418656***
(0.000)
-0.1379699***
(0.000)
-0.0061011***
(0.009)
0.6248693***
(0.000)
12.22094***
(0.000)

Branches Log
Unit Banks Log
Fed Funds Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9356

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B3 Regression of State GDP on Deposits Per Office
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Per Office Log

0.0330969***
(0.005)
0.5699838***
(0.000)
-0.1363223***
(0.000)
-0.0060466***
(0.010)
0.6253016***
(0.000)
12.19328***
(0.000)

Branches Log
Unit Banks Log
Fed Funds Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.936

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B4 Regression of State GDP on Deposits Per Capita
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Per Capita

0.0308956***
(0.008)
0.5418656***
(0.000)
-0.1379699***
(0.000)
-0.0061011***
(0.009)
0.6557649***
(0.000)
12.22094***
(0.000)

Branches Log
Unit Banks Log
Fed Funds Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9356

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table B5Regression of State GDP on Deposits Per State GDP
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Share of State GDP

0.007959***
(0.000)
0.5689024***
(0.000)
-0.1358097***
(0.000)
-0.0062608***
(0.007)
0.6302198***
(0.000)
12.70164***
(0.000)

Branches Log
Unit Banks Log
Fed Funds Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9332

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.

41

Table C1 Regression of State GDP on Branches Per Office
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Log

0.0337274***
(0.009)
4.134844***
(0.000)
-0.0045819***
(0.004)
-0.0023382*
(0.062)
0.9884759***
(0.000)
6.259391***
(0.000)

Branches Per Office
Fed Funds Rate
Failed Banks
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9185

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table C2 Regression of State GDP on Weight of Deposits & Branches
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Per Capita

0.0337274***
(0.009)
4.134844***
(0.000)
-0.0045819***
(0.004)
-0.0023382*
(0.062)
1.022203***
(0.000)
6.259391***
(0.000)

Branches Per Office
Fed Funds Rate
Failed Banks
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9185

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table C3 State GDP on Branches Per 100,000 Residents
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Log

0.0236123*
(0.070)
0.020294***
(0.000)
-0.0881815***
(0.001)
-0.00761***
(0.001)
1.052273***
(0.000)
8.809177***
(0.000)

Branches Per 100,000 Residents
Unit Banks Per 100,000 Residents
Fed Funds Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9354

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table D1 Regression of State GDP on Banking Institutions
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Log

0.0531638***
(0.000)
-0.3107647***
(0.000)
-0.0077762***
(0.000)
1.28112***
(0.000)
6.462778***
(0.000)

Banks Log
Fed Funds Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9310

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table D2 Regression of State GDP on Banks With Branches
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Log

0.0517972***
(0.002)
-0.2363368***
(0.000)
-0.0114348***
(0.000)
1.23311***
(0.000)
6.831968***
(0.000)

Banks With Branches Log
Fed Funds Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9512

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.

46

Table D3 State GDP on Banks With Branches Per Total Banks
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Log

0.0515294***
(0.001)
0.699074***
(0.005)
-0.0123901***
(0.000)
1.043129***
(0.000)
8.195262***
(0.000)

Banks With Branches Per Total Banks
Fed Funds Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9557

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table E1 State GDP on Deposits and Unemployment
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Log

0.0466053***
(0.008)
-0.0070294**
(0.035)
0.0142168***
(0.004)
1.052115***
(0.000)
8.619838***
(0.000)

Fed Funds Rate
Unemployment Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9602

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table E2 State GDP on Deposits Per Office and Unemployment
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Per Office Log

0.0363904**
(0.048)
-0.0068104**
(0.038)
0.0152026***
(0.002)
1.093733***
(0.000)
8.489432***
(0.000)

Fed Funds Rate
Unemployment Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9615

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table E3 State GDP on Deposits Per Capita and Unemployment
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Deposits Per Capita Log

0.0466053***
(0.008)
-0.0070294**
(0.035)
0.0142168***
(0.004)
1.098721***
(0.000)
8.619838***
(0.000)

Fed Funds Rate
Unemployment Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9602

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table E4 GDP on Banks With Branches Per Total Banks and Unemployment
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Banks With Branches Per Total Banks

0.6543091***
(0.009)
-0.0048612*
(0.080)
0.0141749***
(0.001)
1.085487***
(0.000)
8.755773***
(0.000)

Fed Funds Rate
Unemployment Rate
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9533

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table F1 Regression of Deposits on Offices
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Offices Log

1.144823***
(0.000)
-0.0233734**
(0.020)
8.534381*
(0.074)
16.04489***
(0.000)

Fed Funds Rate
Financial Svcs Per State GDP
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.5222

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table F2 Regression of Deposits on Branches
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Branches Log

1.12504***
(0.000)
-0.019585**
(0.045)
8.842435*
(0.060)
16.27683***
(0.000)

Fed Funds Rate
Financial Svcs Per State GDP
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.5303

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table G1 Financial Svcs on Branches and Unit Banks
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Branches Log

0.3689651***
(0.001)
-0.0911513***
(0.009)
0.8860582***
(0.000)
7.266605***
(0.000)

Unit Banks Log
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.7676

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table G2 Financial Svcs on Branches Per 100,000 Residents
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Branches Per 100,000 Residents

0.0150061***
(0.000)
-0.0619785*
(0.057)
1.176897***
(0.000)
4.79976***
(0.003)

Unit Banks Per 100,000 Residents
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.7668

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table G3 Construction on Branches and Unit Banks
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Branches Log

0.2528897***
(0.009)
-0.0727728***
(0.001)
0.8178397***
(0.000)
8.777996***
(0.000)

Unit Banks Log
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9237

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table G4 Trade on Branches and Unit Banks
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Branches Log

0.4684415***
(0.000)
-0.09703***
(0.000)
0.7119141***
(0.000)
9.924611***
(0.000)

Unit Banks Log
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.9646

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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Table G5 Transportation on Branches and Unit Banks
Random Effects - Generalized Least Squares
Variable

Estimated Parameter

Branches Log

0.7519366***
(0.000)
-0.1277685***
(0.000)
0.5237414***
(0.003)
9.518039***
(0.000)

Unit Banks Log
Population Log
Constant

Observations
R-Squared

550
0.8227

Note: P-values are in parentheses. Robust Standard Errors Used.
***Significant at the 1 percent level.
**Significant at the 5 percent level.
*Significant at the 10 percent level.
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